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THE ABIDING EXCEPTIONALISM OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS DOCTRINE
Carlos M. Vázquez∗
In their article The Normalization of Foreign Relations Law, Professors Ganesh Sitaraman and Ingrid Wuerth argue that “[foreign affairs] exceptionalism . . . is now exceptional,”1 and that this is a good
thing. I agree with much of the authors’ normative argument for
“normalization” of foreign affairs doctrine (as they define the term).
But the authors overstate the extent to which such normalization has
already occurred. There have indeed been some recent Supreme Court
decisions that seem to lack the exceptional deference to the Executive
that had characterized judicial decisionmaking in the foreign affairs
area in previous years. But foreign affairs doctrine remains resolutely
exceptionalist in some areas beyond those identified by the authors as
reflecting the “unfinished business” of normalization.2 When these additional manifestations of exceptionalism are added to the ones the authors have identified, the claim that exceptionalism is now exceptional
seems overstated.
I also question the authors’ apparent views about what a “normalized” foreign relations doctrine (as they define the term) would look
like. The authors define normalization according to the baseline of
proper constitutional interpretation.3 In other words, a distinct approach to foreign affairs issues does not count as exceptionalist if such
distinct treatment is supported by the Constitution, properly construed. In defending their normalization thesis, however, the authors
are not always faithful to their definition of the term. They take insufficient account of the possibility that some of the doctrines that they
regard as exceptionalist merely reflect the distinct treatment that the
Constitution contemplates for certain issues in the foreign relations
area.
The authors note that “[s]ome scholars (generally liberals) like[]
exceptionalism in the context of federalism, for example, but not when
it [comes] to executive power. Others (generally conservatives) seem[]
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
∗

Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I am grateful for comments from
Harlan Cohen, Ganesh Sitaraman, and Ingrid Wuerth.
1 Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth, The Normalization of Foreign Relations Law, 128
HARV. L. REV. 1897, 1979 (2015).
2 Id. at 1949.
3 See infra Part I, pp. 307–10. The authors apparently also exempt from the “exceptionalist”
label differences that result from nonconstitutional legal analysis that is “generally applicable.”
See infra Part I, pp. 307–10 (discussing stare decisis).

305

306

HARVARD LAW REVIEW FORUM

[Vol. 128:305

to take the opposite view.”4 But the scholars who have argued that the
states have a more limited role and the executive branch a more expansive one in the foreign relations area than in the domestic area
have based their arguments on the Constitution, not personal predilection. To the extent those constitutional arguments are valid, the resulting distinct treatment of foreign relations questions would not count as
exceptionalist, as the authors define the term. Indeed, under the authors’ definition, a court would be acting in an exceptionalist manner
if it were to treat such foreign affairs questions in the same way as
domestic ones.
Since the authors’ distinction between exceptionalist and normal
decisionmaking turns on a prior conclusion regarding the proper constitutional interpretation on a particular question, the argument that
foreign affairs doctrine was once exceptionalist and has been normalized requires the resolution of some highly contested constitutional
questions. It is not surprising that an article that covers as much
ground as this one does does not engage in a deep constitutional analysis of each of the numerous constitutional doctrines it addresses. I do
not fault the authors for not delving more deeply into such questions,
but it is worth observing that the authors’ claims will not convince
those who do not share the authors’ constitutional interpretations.
Part I of this Response discusses the authors’ definition of exceptionalism and normalization, which the authors describe as “an independent contribution” of the article, “regardless of whether one agrees
with [its] broader normalization thesis.”5 As noted, their definition collapses the question of normalization with the proper interpretation of
the Constitution. In defending their claim that foreign relations law
was once exceptionalist and has become increasingly normalized, however, the authors seem to assume that recognizing a lesser role for the
states in the foreign relations area, or greater discretion in the Executive, is generally exceptionalist. What is missing is a demonstration
that the Constitution, properly construed, assigns the states the same
role, and gives the Executive no broader role, with respect to foreign
affairs than with respect to domestic affairs.
Part II challenges the authors’ characterization of some doctrines
or decisions as exceptionalist. The authors cite Missouri v. Holland6
as an example of foreign relations exceptionalism.7 But the holding of
Missouri v. Holland is supported by the constitutional text and is consistent with original intent and the case law preceding the decision.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
4
5
6
7

Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 1, at 1920.
Id. at 1902.
252 U.S. 416 (1920).
See infra Part II, pp. 311–15.
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Likewise, the holding in United States v. Belmont8 is strongly supported by the constitutional text. Although some of the Court’s reasoning
in the case was admittedly exceptionalist, the Court offered a more
normalized rationale for the outcome a few years later in United States
v. Pink.9 Finally, the authors cite the Court’s recent decisions invigorating the presumption against extraterritoriality as evidence of normalization because the Court rejected the Executive’s proffered interpretations of the relevant statutes.10 But the presumption applied in these
cases is itself exceptionalist in ways not recognized by the authors.
In some respects, the Constitution does fairly clearly provide for
equivalent treatment of foreign and domestic affairs. Part III focuses
on one such area: the judicial enforcement of treaties. As I have written at some length in these pages, the Supremacy Clause establishes
that treaties are to be enforceable in the courts in the same circumstances as statutes.11 Yet the courts have engrafted onto the Supremacy Clause a distinction between self-executing treaties and non-selfexecuting treaties, with only the latter being judicially enforceable.12
Normalization of this doctrine would entail a narrow interpretation of
the category of non-self-executing treaties. I have argued that the Supreme Court’s decisions on this doctrine are consistent with a narrow,
normalized approach,13 but the lower courts have adopted a broad understanding of the doctrine, and the Court’s most recent decision,
Medellín v. Texas,14 has been interpreted by many, including the authors, as endorsing a broad definition of non-self-executing treaties.15
If that interpretation is accepted, it would constitute a very significant
example of exceptionalism in foreign relations doctrine, adding significantly to the authors’ catalog of unfinished business.
I. NORMALIZATION DEFINED
As the authors define it, exceptionalism is “the belief that legal issues arising from foreign relations are functionally, doctrinally, and
even methodologically distinct from those arising in domestic policy.”16
But not all differences between the doctrines applied in the foreign
and domestic contexts count as exceptionalist. “Excluded from [the
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
8
9
10
11

301 U.S. 324 (1937).
315 U.S. 203 (1942).
E.g., Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 1, at 1932.
See generally Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause
and the Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, 122 HARV. L. REV. 599 (2008).
12 See Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 505 (2008).
13 See Vázquez, supra note 11, at 649.
14 552 U.S. 491.
15 See infra note 90 and accompanying text.
16 Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 1, at 1900.
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authors’] definition [of exceptionalism] are distinctions between foreign
and domestic powers that result from generally applicable formalist
analysis based on, for example, constitutional text and original history.”17 As an example, the authors point to the distinct procedures set
forth in the Constitution for concluding treaties as opposed to enacting
statutes.18 “If generally applicable analysis of text and original history
allocates foreign affairs powers in particular ways, that allocation is
still at the baseline”19 and is thus not an example of exceptionalism.
This is not the only available definition of exceptionalism, or the
most intuitive. The authors could have distinguished between proper
and improper exceptionalism. On this view, distinct approaches would
always count as exceptionalist, but some exceptionalism would be
proper because it would be justified through valid constitutional analysis, based, for example, on text and original history. The authors define exceptionalism more narrowly because, in their view, “[t]he purpose of the term is not just to state that foreign and domestic affairs
are legally distinct in particular ways, but also to evaluate whether
those differences are appropriate.”20 In other words, exceptionalism is
by definition inappropriate.
The authors appear to recognize only “formalist” constitutional argument as a proper — and hence not exceptionalist — basis for employing distinct approaches to resolving legal issues in the foreign and
domestic spheres. Presumably this is not because functionalist constitutional argument is unknown in the domestic context, but because the
authors reject functionalist arguments for distinctions between the foreign and domestic spheres on normative grounds (for the reasons set
forth in Part III of the article). Even if one agrees with the authors’
normative arguments for normalization, however, determining where
the line falls between proper constitutional bases for distinct approaches and improper exceptionalism is not straightforward. Clearly,
the authors would reject as improper exceptionalism distinct treatment
based on the judge’s belief that distinct treatment is desirable for functionalist reasons. Just as clearly, the authors would accept as proper
non-exceptionalism distinct treatment required by the constitutional
text, even if the text reflects the Founders’ adherence to functionalist
arguments of the sort the authors reject. For example, the authors reject the claim that greater limitations on state power are justified in
the foreign context on the ground that “individual states can externalize the costs of violating international law, because retaliation for the
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
17
18
19
20

Id. at 1908.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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offense would be visited on the nation as a whole.”21 Yet the Founders
relied on just this rationale in adopting certain constitutional provisions. Thus, Hamilton explained Article III’s grant of federal jurisdiction over certain foreign relations matters on the ground that “the
Peace of the WHOLE ought not to be left at the disposal of a
PART.”22
Because the authors also consider constitutional argument based on
“original history” to be a proper basis for concluding that different
treatment is proper and thus not exceptionalist, presumably they
would accept differences based on original intent but not memorialized
in the constitutional text. If so, there would appear to be a plausible
constitutional justification for some of the doctrines that the authors
regard as exceptionalist, such as those based on the structural problems that Hamilton identified with leaving foreign relations matters in
the hands of the states. A textualist would object to judicial recognition of doctrines not grounded in text even if supported by the Founders’ broad concerns about leaving foreign relations matters to the
states.23 But nontextual constitutional interpretation is hardly exceptional in the domestic context. The Court has recognized constitutional rights based on “penumbras, formed by emanations” from the constitutional text.24 If such emanations are accepted in domestic decisionmaking, it seems difficult to dismiss as exceptionalist doctrines
based on emanations from the Constitution’s allocation of numerous
foreign relations powers to the federal government. From this perspective, the dormant foreign relations doctrine (criticized by the authors as exceptionalist25) seems no more exceptionalist than the
dormant commerce clause doctrine. This is not to say that textual and
nontextual approaches are necessarily equally legitimate. A Justice or
scholar can argue that both dormant doctrines are illegitimate. The
point, rather, is that determining whether any particular doctrine is ex–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
21 Id. at 1942 (citing Carlos M. Vázquez, Customary International Law as U.S. Law: A Critique of the Revisionist and Intermediate Positions and a Defense of the Modern Position, 86
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1495, 1517 (2011)).
22 THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 475 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003).
23 Notably, however, some textualists read very general constitutional texts, such as the Executive Power Vesting Clause, as allocating very extensive powers to the President with respect to
foreign relations matters. See MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 5–6 (2007).
24 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). The authors seem to recognize the prevalence of nontextual constitutional decisionmaking when they implicitly criticize as exceptionalist
the Supreme Court’s refusal in Missouri v. Holland to recognize limits on the Treaty Power based
on an “invisible radiation” from the Tenth Amendment, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920). See Sitaraman
& Wuerth, supra note 1, at 1916 (noting that Missouri v. Holland’s reasoning was based on a
sharp distinction between domestic and foreign affairs).
25 See Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 1, at 1920–21.

310

HARVARD LAW REVIEW FORUM

[Vol. 128:305

ceptionalist, as the authors define the term, requires resolution of longrunning debates about the proper way to interpret the Constitution.
The authors’ acceptance of stare decisis as a proper (and thus not
exceptionalist) ground of decisionmaking — “so long as it is applied
the same way in domestic and foreign affairs cases”26 — adds further
complications. Stare decisis would justify adhering to otherwise
exceptionalist doctrines and thus problematizes the authors’ call for
normalization. Indeed, I have argued that the dormant foreign affairs
doctrine of Zschernig v. Miller27 (criticized by the authors as exceptionalist28) is entitled to the strong version of stare decisis applied to
statutes as opposed to the weaker version applied to constitutional decisions.29 This argument is based on generally applicable stare decisis
principles, specifically, the fact that dormant foreign relations decisions, like dormant commerce clause decisions and decisions interpreting statutes, are revisable by Congress.30 To the extent the dormant
foreign relations doctrine is justified by generally applicable stare
decisis principles, it would appear to be non-exceptionalist as the authors define the term. Additionally, it is possible that adherence to exceptionalist decisions on stare decisis grounds would justify additional
exceptionalist decisions in related areas not just for reasons of doctrinal coherence, but also because a non-exceptionalist decision, when
combined with the exceptionalist decision retained for stare decisis
reasons, would leave us further from the constitutionally correct outcome than would an exceptionalist decision.31 If so, then the (otherwise) exceptionalist decision would qualify as non-exceptionalist as the
authors define the term.
In sum, the authors’ definition of exceptionalism exempts from that
label any distinction justified by valid constitutional and even
nonconstitutional arguments. A judge’s reliance on her own belief that
foreign relations cases are different would count as exceptionalist, but
her reliance on the Founders’ adherence to such beliefs would not necessarily. Adherence to exceptionalist decisions would not be exceptionalist if supported by generally applicable principles of stare decisis.
Indeed, reversal of exceptionalist decisions would count as exceptionalist if based on departures from generally applicable stare decisis
principles.

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
26
27
28
29
30
31

Id. at 1908 n.32.
389 U.S. 429 (1968).
See Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 1, at 1927.
See Carlos Manuel Vázquez, W(h)ither Zschernig?, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1259, 1272 (2001).
See id. at 1271–72.
For an example, see my discussion of Medellín’s second holding in Part III, infra.
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II. QUESTIONABLE CHARACTERIZATIONS
In light of the authors’ acceptance of distinctions between foreign
and domestic doctrines grounded in valid constitutional analysis (at
least if “formalist”), some of their characterizations of doctrines as
exceptionalist would appear not to deserve that label. Moreover, some
of the developments that the authors claim as support for their normalization thesis would appear to be exceptionalist in respects the authors do not seem to recognize.
In their narrative of the rise of exceptionalism, the authors devote a
paragraph to Court’s holding in Missouri v. Holland.32 Although the
authors hedge in their characterization of the decision as exceptionalist,33 they conclude their discussion of the case with the claim
that this “famously opaque” decision “seemed to rest [partly on] exceptionalist grounds.”34 In my view, the Court’s holding and analysis
were well grounded in text and original history and hence not
exceptionalist.
As described by the authors, the Court in Missouri v. Holland held
that “the federal government has broader power acting pursuant to the
Treaty Power than it does pursuant to the Commerce Clause,” and,
“arguably,” “that Tenth Amendment limitations do not apply to the
Treaty Power.”35 But the conclusion that the limitations of the Commerce Clause do not apply to the Treaty Power is amply supported by
the constitutional text, which in Article II confers the Treaty Power on
the President (“with the Advice and Consent of the Senate”),36 without
linking it in any way to the Commerce Power conferred on Congress
in Article I.37 Even if the Treaty Power had been placed in Article I,
there would be no greater reason to conclude that the limits of the
Commerce Power apply to it than to conclude that the limits of the
power to raise and support armies or to create a post office apply to
the Commerce Power. It is, indeed, the claim that the limits of the
Commerce Power apply to the Treaty Power that conflicts with the
constitutional text. As for the Tenth Amendment, the Court merely
noted, uncontroversially, that its reservation to the states of the powers
not delegated to the federal government was beside the point, since Article II delegates the Treaty Power to the federal government.38 The
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
32
33

See Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 1, at 1916–17.
See id. at 1916 (stating that Missouri v. Holland “arguably contributed to the rise of foreign
relations exceptionalism”); id. at 1928 n.173 (stating that Missouri v. Holland was “arguably an
exceptionalist opinion”).
34 Id. at 1917.
35 Id. at 1916.
36 See U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
37 See id.
38 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920).
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Court’s refusal to find that the treaty was “forbidden by some invisible
radiation from the general terms of the Tenth Amendment”39 might be
regarded as exceptional if the Court had found such radiations in the
domestic context, but the Court’s Lochner-era decisions were based on
a narrow interpretation of the Commerce Clause rather than on emanations from the Tenth Amendment.40 The authors claim that the
Court’s reasoning “was premised on a sharp distinction between domestic and foreign affairs,”41 and cite as exceptionalist the Court’s
statement that the limits of the Treaty Power “must be ascertained in a
different way.”42 But the different texts require different approaches
to ascertaining the limits of the two clauses. And, of course, determining the scope of the Treaty Power requires consideration of the purpose and nature of a treaty as an instrument of international relations.43 The Court’s holding and analysis in Missouri v. Holland was
no more exceptionalist than the authors’ acceptance of the different
methods of concluding treaties and statutes.44
Also defensible on the basis of constitutional text is the decision
in United States v. Belmont,45 which also plays a prominent role in
the authors’ narrative of the rise of exceptionalism.46 The Court in
Belmont upheld and gave preemptive effect to the Litvinov Assignment, a sole executive agreement.47 Justice Sutherland’s rationale for
upholding the Assignment was indeed very broad, relying on his
Curtiss-Wright theory that all state lines disappear with respect to ex–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
39
40

Id. at 434.
See generally Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Even if the domestic cases had
rested on “radiations” from the Tenth Amendment, the fact that these radiations came subsequently to be rejected as mistaken would arguably justify at least a retroactive acceptance of
Holland as proper non-exceptionalism. More generally, to the extent a current domestic doctrine
is misguided, it might well be preferable to find the doctrine inapplicable in the foreign relations
context than to extend the misguided doctrine to foreign relations cases. With respect to modern
Tenth and Eleventh Amendment doctrines, I have expressed the view that it would be better to
apply the misguided doctrines and seek their reversal in both contexts. See Carlos Manuel
Vázquez, Breard, Printz, and the Treaty Power, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1317 (1999); Carlos Manuel
Vázquez, Treaties and the Eleventh Amendment, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 713 (2002). But I see the appeal of the contrary view.
41 Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 1, at 1916.
42 Id. at 1917 n.81 (quoting Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. at 433) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
43 This is presumably the part of the opinion that the authors believe relied upon a “sharp distinction” between foreign and domestic affairs.
44 The authors write that “[t]he historical foundations of Missouri v. Holland are contested.”
Id. at 1916 n.80. My own research has led me to agree with the scholars cited by the authors as
supporting the decision’s consistency with prior history. See Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Missouri v.
Holland’s Second Holding, 73 MO. L. REV. 939 (2008).
45 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
46 See Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 1, at 1915–16.
47 Belmont, 301 U.S. at 332.

2015]

ABIDING EXCEPTIONALISM

313

ternal affairs.48 But shortly thereafter the Court offered a narrower
justification for upholding the Assignment in United States v. Pink.49
Justice Douglas’s opinion for the Court in that case stressed the fact
that the Assignment was part of a broader package that resulted in the
United States’ recognition of the Soviet Union.50 The Executive’s exclusive power to recognize foreign nations and their governments has
textual support in Article II’s allocation to the President of the power
to send and receive ambassadors.51 The Court in Pink tied the validity of the sole executive agreement in that case to its connection with
recognition.52 The settlement of claims of American citizens against
the Soviet Union was an obstacle to recognition of the Soviet Union,
and the assignment to the United States of Russian claims against
Americans was part of a package to compensate U.S. citizens and thus
remove this obstacle. “Power to remove such obstacles to full recognition as settlement of claims of our nationals,” the Court wrote, “certainly is a modest implied power of the President.”53 Later extensions
in Dames & Moore54 and Garamendi55 certainly took executive power
further, but the holdings of Belmont and Pink, if not all of the language in the opinions, were well founded in generally applicable constitutional doctrine.
The authors’ definition of exceptionalism also gives rise to the possibility that the very same doctrinal development might be an example
of normalization along one dimension but an example of exceptionalization along another. Some of the Roberts Court decisions that the
authors cite in support of their normalization thesis appear to be exceptionalist along dimensions not discussed by the authors. The authors identify three main categories of exceptionalist doctrine: “nonjusticiability, which suggests expansive deference to the political
branches; federalism, which rejects state and local participation in foreign relations; and executive dominance, which allocates power within
the federal political branches to the executive.”56 Their examples of
normalization fall overwhelmingly in the third category. Many involve
the Court’s rejection of interpretations of treaties or statutes proffered
by the executive branch. Among the latter, the authors cite Morrison57
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57

Id. at 331 (citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316 (1936)).
315 U.S. 203 (1942).
See id. at 211–13.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
E.g., 315 U.S. at 227.
Id. at 229.
Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003).
Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 1, at 1902.
Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
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and Kiobel,58 which held that the presumption against extraterritoriality applies to section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act59 and to the
federal common law cause of action recognized in Sosa v. AlvarezMachain,60 respectively.61
While these decisions may reflect normalization insofar as they rejected the interpretations of the statutes proposed by the executive
branch, the Court’s invigoration of the presumption against extraterritoriality in these cases is exceptionalist from the nonjusticiability perspective, as it removes discretion from the courts in order to safeguard
the nation’s foreign relations interests. As the Court has explained,
this presumption guards against unintended clashes with the laws
of other nations.62 But this purpose could have been served by other
approaches to statutory interpretation. For example, with respect to
the antitrust laws, the lower courts had developed and applied a jurisdictional rule of reason, which sought to ascertain the likelihood of
clashes with the laws of other states on a case-by-case basis.63 Justice
Scalia favored this approach in his dissent in the Hartford Fire case.64
With respect to Alien Tort Statute cases, Justice Breyer’s concurrence
in Kiobel similarly favored a more fine-grained analysis of federal interests in the international sphere.65 The Court’s rejection of this approach in favor of a strong presumption against extraterritoriality is
apparently based on its view that the assessment of the foreign relations consequences of applying federal law extraterritorially is not a
suitable task for the judiciary. The Court instead adopted an approach that overprotects the interest in avoiding offense to foreign
sovereigns. The Court sought to achieve this goal, moreover, by disabling the courts from employing ordinary means of statutory interpretation, such as by, apparently, precluding resort to legislative history.66
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
58
59
60
61

Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883.
542 U.S. 692 (2004).
The authors describe Kiobel as applying the presumption against extraterritoriality to the
Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012). See Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 1, at 1932. That
the Court in fact applied the presumption to the federal common law cause of action recognized
in Sosa, rather than to the Alien Tort Statute qua jurisdictional statute, is explained in Carlos M.
Vázquez, Things We Do with Presumptions: Reflections on Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 89
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1719, 1730 (2014).
62 See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664.
63 See, e.g., Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n, 549 F.2d 597,
613–15 (9th Cir. 1976), superseded by statute, Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982,
Pub. L. No. 97-290, tit. IV, § 402, 96 Stat. 1233, 1246 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2012)).
64 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 817 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
65 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1671 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
66 Thus, in EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244 (1991), which the Court in
Morrison relied upon, see e.g., Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010),
Justice Marshall noted that the House Report made it clear that the statute was intended to apply
to discrimination by U.S. employers against U.S. employees employed abroad. Aramco, 499 U.S.
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The Court’s adoption of a method of statutory interpretation that
overprotects the federal interest in avoiding international friction and
precludes resort to ordinary means of ascertaining statutory meaning,
grounded on its distrust of the courts’ ability to assess the likelihood of
such friction in individual cases, is decidedly exceptionalist with respect to justiciability.
The authors appear to recognize that Morrison and Kiobel diminish the authority of the courts, but they claim that “[t]he result has
been to further shift power toward Congress at the expense of the executive.”67 In fact, the presumption against extraterritoriality diminishes Congress’s role by requiring courts to disregard probative evidence of its intent, imposing a requirement of clarity beyond what is
necessary for statutes not touching on foreign affairs. Nor does the
presumption against extraterritoriality, when compared to other available approaches, necessarily diminish the role of the Executive. Contrary to the authors’ claim that “a case-by-case approach . . . would afford more control to the executive branch,”68 a case-by-case approach
need not incorporate deference to the Executive. The presumption
against extraterritoriality seems based more on distrust of the courts
than a desire to limit the role of the Executive.69
III. MEDELLÍN’S EXCEPTIONALISM
There are, to be sure, a number of respects in which the Constitution contemplates that foreign and domestic affairs will be treated similarly. I agree with the authors’ contention that the Court’s broad
application of nonjusticiability doctrines and the exceptionally broad
deference it has often given to the Executive’s views in certain foreign
relations cases qualify as exceptionalist. Normalization of some of
these doctrines is desirable for the reasons given by the authors. But I
am not as sure as the authors that the cases they discuss reflect the
Court’s commitment to normalizing foreign relations law. The data
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
at 268 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion ignored this evidence
of legislative intent in construing the statute’s alien exemption. Morrison may represent a retreat
from Aramco insofar as the Court recognized that the presumption against extraterritoriality is
not a clear statement rule and acknowledged that “context” may be consulted. Morrison, 130 S.
Ct. at 2883. But the Court recognized the relevance of context only to “give the most faithful
reading” of the text, and it again declined to consider legislative history. Id. (quoting id. at 2892
(Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment)) (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. id. at 2892
(Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[E]vidence [of legislative intent] legitimately encompasses more than the enacted text.”).
67 Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 1, at 1933.
68 Id. at 1932.
69 Cf. Harlan Grant Cohen, Formalism and Distrust: Foreign Affairs Law in the Roberts
Court, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 380 (2015) (arguing that the Roberts Court’s foreign relations decisions reflect distrust of lower courts as well as of the executive and legislative branches).
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points are relatively few, and they may reflect ad hoc coalitions around
particular results in the relevant cases. Moreover, there are counterexamples that the authors do not consider. Most significantly, the authors do not discuss what I regard as perhaps the most important doctrine in need of normalization — the doctrine of non-self-executing
treaties. The recent decision in Medellín v. Texas,70 as the authors interpret it, reflects a giant step in the direction of exceptionalism.71
When added to the cases identified by the authors as reflecting the unfinished business of normalization, Medellín suggests that the Court
may be rejecting exceptionalism only selectively and opportunistically.
The Court’s failure to review numerous exceptionalist lower court decisions lends support to this alternative thesis.72
The Supremacy Clause provides a clear textual indication of the
Founders’ intent to “normalize” treaty enforcement doctrine. Before
the Constitution was adopted, the United States adhered to the British
rule, under which treaties were not judicially enforceable until incorporated into domestic law by statute.73 The Supremacy Clause reflects
the Founders’ intent to reject the British rule and dispense with the
need for treaties to be implemented by statute. The clause declares
“all Treaties” to be the “supreme Law of the Land,”74 along with federal statutes and the Constitution itself, and instructs judges to give ef–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
70
71

552 U.S. 491 (2008).
The authors acknowledge in a footnote that I have argued that a broad understanding of
the doctrine of non-self-executing treaties “does not comport with constitutional text and history
(and therefore could be characterized as exceptionalist).” Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 1, at
1929 n.186. But I am hardly alone in so viewing this doctrine. See, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, Response, History Right?: Historical Scholarship, Original Understanding, and Treaties as “Supreme
Law of the Land,” 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2095 (1999); Vasan Kesavan, The Three Tiers of Federal
Law, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1479, 1488–89 (2006); Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J.
INT’L. L. 760, 760–64 (1988); Michael D. Ramsey, Toward a Rule of Law in Foreign Affairs, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 1450, 1469–73 (2006) (reviewing JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND
PEACE (2005)); David Sloss, Non-Self-Executing Treaties: Exposing a Constitutional Fallacy, 36
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 7 (2002); Michael P. Van Alstine, Federal Common Law in an Age of Treaties, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 892, 907–17 (2004); cf. Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Executing the
Treaty Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1867, 1928 (2005) (“[S]elf-executing treaties are the paradigm,
and non-self-executing treaties — though very much in the ascendancy today — were meant to be
the exception rather than the rule.”). But see John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955 (1999); John
C. Yoo, Rejoinder, Treaties and Public Lawmaking: A Textual and Structural Defense of Non-SelfExecution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2218 (1999).
72 See generally Stephen I. Vladeck, The Exceptionalism of Foreign Relations Normalization,
128 HARV. L. REV. F. 322 (2015) (“[T]here are dozens of other examples of foreign relations
exceptionalism in recent lower court decisions [that] have been wholly undisturbed by the Supreme Court.” Id. at 322 (emphasis omitted).).
73 See Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Response, Laughing at Treaties, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2154,
2158–59 (1999); see also Carlos Manuel Vázquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties,
89 AM. J. INT’L L. 695, 698–99 (1995) [hereinafter Vázquez, Four Doctrines].
74 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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fect to all three forms of federal law.75 This text strongly supports the
conclusion that treaties should be enforceable in domestic courts in the
same circumstances as federal statutes and constitutional provisions
are.76 Yet, in Foster v. Neilson,77 the Court in 1829 ruled that some
treaties require implementing legislation — a category that has since
become known as non-self-executing treaties.78 The doctrine of nonself-executing treaties has been accurately described as among “the
most confounding in treaty law.”79
The Court subsequently reversed its holding that the treaty involved in Foster was non-self-executing,80 and it largely ignored the
doctrine for most of the following two centuries, applying treaties as
law in numerous cases without pausing to consider whether they were
self-executing.81 In the latter half of the twentieth century, however,
the lower courts began applying the doctrine vigorously in what can
only be described as an exceptionalist manner. Indeed, it was frequently said during this period that non-self-executing treaties lacked
the force of domestic law.82 Some courts held that treaties were selfexecuting, and hence judicially enforceable, only if they disclosed an
intent that they should have the force of domestic law.83 The incompatibility of these statements with the clear text of the Constitution,
which declares that “all Treaties” have the force of domestic law,
shows the highly exceptionalist nature of this doctrine. As applied by
these courts, the doctrine sharply distinguishes the standards for enforcing treaties from those applicable to the enforcement of statutes,
despite the clear constitutional text indicating that both are the “supreme Law of the Land” to be enforced by judges. After all, we do not
say that federal statutes have the force of domestic law only if they
disclose an intent that they have such force.
In prior work, I have attempted to reconcile the doctrine of nonself-executing treaties with the Supremacy Clause’s text.84 I have
identified four types of reasons why a treaty might not be judicially
enforceable even though it is the supreme law of the land. The four
types of reasons correspond to reasons why analogous federal statutes
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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See id.
See Paul B. Stephan, Private Remedies for Treaty Violations After Sanchez-Llamas, 11
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 65, 86 (2007); Tim Wu, Treaties’ Domains, 93 VA. L. REV. 571, 577–78
(2007). See generally Vázquez, supra note 11, at 611–28.
77 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
78 See id. at 314.
79 United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 876 (5th Cir. 1979).
80 United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 88–89 (1833).
81 See Vázquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 73, at 716 & n.99.
82 See id. at 703 & n.37.
83 See, e.g., Igartúa-De La Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145, 150 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc).
84 See Vázquez, supra note 11; Vázquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 73.
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would not be judicially enforceable. In other words, I have argued for
a normalization of the doctrine of non-self-executing treaties. In particular, I have argued that, to the extent the self-execution issue turns
on intent, the court should conclude that the treaty is judicially enforceable unless it states clearly that its provisions are subject to legislative implementation.
The Court in Medellín recently had an opportunity to normalize
the doctrine of non-self-executing treaties, but it is fair to say that it
did not do so. The issue was whether the Texas courts were required
to comply with a judgment of the International Court of Justice
(ICJ).85 Despite a treaty provision stating that the parties “undertake[]
to comply” with the judgments of the ICJ,86 the Court found no
domestic-law obligation to comply with the judgments of the ICJ.87
Much of the Court’s analysis was distinctly exceptionalist. The clear
text of the Supremacy Clause would appear to require the conclusion
that our undertaking to comply with the ICJ’s judgments has the force
of domestic law. But the Court completely ignored the constitutional
text — a notably exceptionalist approach to constitutional interpretation that contrasts sharply with the Court’s approach to deciding constitutional issues that very Term in cases such as District of Columbia
v. Heller.88 In clarifying what it meant by a non-self-executing treaty,
the Court wrote:
What we mean by “self-executing” is that the treaty has automatic domestic effect as federal law upon ratification. Conversely, a “non-selfexecuting” treaty does not by itself give rise to domestically enforceable
federal law. Whether such a treaty has domestic effect depends upon implementing legislation passed by Congress.89

Since the Supremacy Clause itself gives “all Treaties” automatic effect
as federal law upon ratification, the Court’s very definition of the concept of non-self-execution was strikingly exceptionalist. In finding the
treaty to be non-self-executing, the Court cited with approval some of
the exceptionalist lower court decisions mentioned above,90 leading
some courts and commentators to conclude that the Court had established a strong presumption against self-execution, rebuttable only by
clear evidence that the treaty was intended to have the force of domes–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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See Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 498 (2008).
Id. at 508.
Id. at 509.
554 U.S. 570 (2008).
Medellín, 552 U.S. at 505 n.2.
See id. at 505 (“[W]hile treaties ‘may comprise international commitments . . . they are not
domestic law unless Congress has either enacted implementing statutes or the treaty itself conveys
an intention that it be “self-executing” and is ratified on these terms.’” (omission in original) (quoting Igartúa-De La Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145, 150 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc))).
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tic law.91 As already noted, in enforcing statutes, we do not ask
whether Congress intended that the statute have the force of domestic
law.
The proper interpretation of Medellín is uncertain, as the Court
gave a number of reasons, not all consistent with each other, for finding the treaty involved in that case to be non-self-executing.92 Most
scholars agree that much of the Court’s exceptionalist analysis cannot
be taken seriously.93 I have argued that some of the Court’s analysis is
consistent with a narrow, normalized version of the doctrine of nonself-execution. Specifically, I have argued that the Court understood
the term “undertakes” to mean something other than “shall” or “must”
comply, and thus concluded that the treaty did not in fact impose an
absolute obligation to comply with ICJ judgments.94 The Court appeared to understand the treaty to impose instead an obligation to use
best efforts to comply. If so, the Court’s interpretation of the treaty
was erroneous, but its conclusion that such a treaty was non-selfexecuting was not.95
Whether a normalized interpretation of Medellín will be widely
adopted remains to be seen. But I note that the authors do not embrace it, as they describe Medellín as finding the treaty to be non-selfexecuting even though the Court viewed “the ICJ judgment [as] binding on the United States as a matter of international law.”96 If the authors are right, then Medellín’s approach to non-self-executing treaties
stands as a huge counterexample to their thesis that the trend during
the Roberts Court has been towards normalization of foreign relations
doctrine. Indeed, unless normalized as I suggest, Medellín’s approach
to the judicial enforcement of one of the three categories of federal law
identified in the Supremacy Clause would appear to be an enormous
step by the Roberts Court in the direction of exceptionalism.
The authors cite Medellín as exemplifying normalization of foreign
relations law in two respects. First, they argue that the Court’s rejection of the dissent’s “arrestingly indeterminate” approach to the self–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
91 See, e.g., Mora v. New York, 524 F.3d 183, 202 (2d Cir. 2008) (stating that Medellín
“adopt[ed] a clear-statement rule for determining when treaties are self-executing”).
92 See Vázquez, supra note 11, at 652–65.
93 See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, Intent, Presumptions, and Non-Self-Executing Treaties, 102
AM. J. INT’L L. 540, 541 (2008) (arguing that, despite the Court’s language quoted above, the
Court must have meant that non-self-executing treaties do have the force of domestic law but are
merely not judicially enforceable). Even Ted Cruz, who argued the case on behalf of Texas, concedes that non-self-executing treaties have the force of domestic law. See Medellin v. Texas - Part
I: Self-Execution, FEDERALIST SOC’Y (Mar. 28, 2008), http://www.fed-soc.org/publications
/detail/medellin-v-texas-part-i-self-execution [http://perma.cc/33C4-KGGE] (remarks of Sen. R.
Ted Cruz).
94 Vázquez, supra note 11, at 660–62.
95 Id. at 663–65.
96 Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 1, at 1929.
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execution enhanced the power of Congress while diminishing that of
the Executive.97 But it is unclear why enhancing the power of Congress counts as normalization (particularly when the constitutional text
was intended to dispense with the need for legislative implementation).
Moreover, as discussed above, an indeterminate approach need not incorporate deference to the Executive. Indeed, the Court’s unwillingness to trust the courts with a case-by-case assessment appears to be in
tension with the authors’ recognition that nonjusticiability doctrines
count as exceptionalist. In any event, the Court could have normalized
self-execution doctrine along the dimensions the authors discuss by
adopting a “bright-line” presumption that treaties are self-executing.
Such a holding would have had the additional benefit of being in accord with a generally applicable formalist approach to constitutional
interpretation.
The authors also count as an example of normalization the Court’s
refusal in Medellín to give effect to the President’s memorandum instructing the state courts to comply with the ICJ’s judgment.98 While
this holding does diminish the role of the Executive, I would argue
that upholding the President’s power to order compliance would have
been the less exceptionalist holding. After all, there was a treaty in
force by which the United States undertook to comply with the judgments of the ICJ. The only reason the Court had to reach the question
of the validity of the President’s memorandum was because of its highly exceptionalist decision finding that treaty to be non-self-executing.99
In light of its exceptionalist approach to self-execution, the Court’s acceptance of a presidential power to require compliance with a non-selfexecuting treaty would have resulted in a less exceptionalist outcome
overall than rejection of such a power. The normalized outcome
would have been direct enforcement of the treaty provision requiring
compliance with the ICJ judgment. The Court’s exceptionalist ruling
on non-self-execution combined with an acceptance of a presidential
power to require compliance would have come closer to that normalized outcome than its exceptionalist ruling on non-self-execution combined with its rejection of such a presidential power. Under the first
alternative, compliance turns on the President’s consent, which is closer to the normalized outcome than the second alternative, which requires the consent of the President plus a majority of both Houses of
Congress. To be sure, adjusting the powers of one branch to compensate for a shift in doctrine in a related area is not a conventional or
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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Id. at 1933 (citing Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 515 (2008)).
Id. at 1931–32.
I am assuming here that my normalized reading of Medellín is not adopted.
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widely used approach to constitutional interpretation, but it is a defensible generally applicable approach.100
Even if the part of Medellín rejecting the President’s memorandum
were considered separately from the Court’s exceptionalist non-selfexecution holding, I doubt that it reflects a move by the Roberts Court
towards normalization of foreign relations doctrine. As the authors
note, the Court relied primarily on the notion that the existence of a
non-self-executing treaty placed the case in the third Youngstown category,101 meaning that the President would have had greater power to
require compliance if there had been no treaty undertaking to comply
with ICJ judgments.102 This reasoning is not just “weak,” as the authors acknowledge,103 but absurd.104 Still, it is what the Court said.105
To the extent the Court relied on this reasoning, Medellín does not tell
us anything about the President’s power to require compliance with
ICJ judgments, or take other action on his own authority, in the absence of a non-self-executing treaty.
IV. CONCLUSION
Professors Sitaraman and Wuerth make a strong case that normalization of foreign relations law would be desirable in many contexts
and that the Court has made some moves in this direction. However,
their characterization of certain foreign relations doctrines as exceptionalist is subject to question under their own definition of exceptionalism. Moreover, they have overlooked an important doctrine in
dire need of normalization that the Roberts Court has taken in an
exceptionalist direction. Adding the Court’s exceptional treatment of
this doctrine to the list of other doctrines that the authors acknowledge
remain to be normalized calls into question the authors’ conclusion
that exceptionalism has become exceptional.
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100 For a suggested application of this approach in the domestic context, see Carlos Manuel
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